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FDA AND THE ADAPTATION OF REGULATORY MODELS 
MARGARET GILHOOLEY* 
Food and drug law has been a niche part of the academic curriculum, 
perhaps seen as too esoteric for those without a medical or technical 
background.  The increased recognition of the importance of the diet to health 
and the significance of drugs to health and health costs may increase interest in 
the course itself.  In administrative law, developments at the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) do not get the analysis topics such as environmental 
regulation get, even though the FDA has contributed its share of notable cases 
found in casebooks.1  Professor Eric Claeys’s paper2 makes a very useful 
contribution by putting FDA regulation into the framework of the larger 
administrative law themes about government regulation.  He examines the 
FDA in light of the eras of regulation identified by Cass Sunstein and the 
changes brought about by the views among scholars and other “elites” about 
how best to run agencies.3  Professor Claeys has also gone back to key sources 
such as Richard Merrill’s analysis of the FDA and James Landis’s study of the 
administrative agencies in the New Deal and the Kennedy Administration. 
As Claeys’s paper notes, the FDA has layers of different models of 
regulation, with the Progressive era model still predominant for foods and the 
Great Society command and control licensing model key in the drug field.  His 
paper also makes a useful analogy that some health protection statutes simply 
give the agency a fire alarm role, while others give it a wider police patrol or 
preventive management role.4  The FDA has also been described as 
“proactive” and “entrepreneurial” in administering statutes.5 
In looking for lessons and models from the FDA experience, I will 
comment briefly on a few points: the importance of an agency’s adaptive role 
 
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School.  Based on comments at Saint Louis University 
Health Law Symposium, Mar. 26, 2004. 
 1. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (presumption of non-review of enforcement 
discretion); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (presumption of reviewability and test 
for ripeness); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(discussing tests for review of legislative rules). 
 2. See Eric R. Claeys, The Food and Drug Administration and the Command-and-Control 
Model of Regulation, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 105 (2004). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
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and judicial review under that model, the significance of legislative 
rulemaking, the impact of the recent statutory and constitutional deregulation 
of food and drug law, and the uncharted impact on drug regulation of the new 
efforts to limit drug costs.  The overall lesson for health law is the need for, 
and the appropriateness of, agencies taking the initiative to adapt the law to 
deal with new problems. 
I.  THE RANGE OF THE AGENCY’S ADAPTIVE ROLE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The FDA’s adaptive role is most dramatically seen against the background 
of the strict command and control licensing schemes adopted by Congress.  
Particularly notable is the pre-market approval requirement enacted in 1958 for 
food additives not generally recognized by experts as safe (GRAS) and the 
prohibition on the addition of any carcinogenic additive to foods.6  In 1962, in 
landmark legislation of the Kennedy Administration, new drugs had to be 
approved in advance for efficacy based on adequate and well-controlled 
studies.7  Meeting the drug testing requirements takes years and can cost up to 
$800 million according to an estimate that has engendered debate.8  In the 
1970s, Congress adopted a less rigorous statutory scheme for medical devices 
with the agency’s support.  That scheme was less strict because of the 
“economic, physical, safety, and use differences between drugs and devices.”9 
Peter Hutt, chief counsel for the FDA in the early 1970s, articulated a 
“regulatory philosophy” that the statute should be regarded as a constitution 
and that the agency should seek to achieve the general objectives of the law in 
creative ways that do not violate statutory restrictions.10  This philosophy 
reflects an expansive view of the mission that Congress has delegated to 
agencies.  It assumes with confidence that the agency can and should adapt the 
law to new circumstances.  It also echoes the problem-solving role that New 
Deal theorists saw for administrative agencies, a role not fully captured by 
reference to agency expertise, as if the role related only to technical matters.11 
 
 6. 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2000); 21 U.S.C. § 348 (2000) (barring any carcinogenic additive). 
 7. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000). 
 8. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug 
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003) (estimating the costs associated with drug 
testing requirements). See, e.g., MERRILL GOOZNER, THE $800 MILLION PILL: THE TRUTH 
BEHIND THE COST OF NEW DRUGS 238–39 (2004) (debating DiMasi’s estimation). 
 9. Claeys, supra note 2. 
 10. Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act, 28 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 177, 178–79 (1973). 
 11. See Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 
67 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1133 (1954).  He describes the role of the staff: 
Where regulation is enacted there is conflict.  Large forces find themselves in opposition, 
each seeking solutions which threaten social unity . . . . [J]ust at these points 
administration has a legitimate role in creating solutions.  The agencies, specialized and 
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The use of the adaptive approach can lead to an expansion of the agency’s 
authority, as shown by the FDA’s rule that food products bear codes to 
facilitate recalls, an expansion upheld by the courts even though the authority 
was not explicit.12  On the other hand, the adaptive approach can also lead to 
deregulation.  For example, the agency’s authority to set food standards 
discouraged changes in food products.  The FDA reinterpreted the law in a 
way that permitted non-standardized foods to be sold with new, non-
misleading names—a change the courts accepted.13 
In recent years, the agency has lessened the rigors of the drug efficacy 
requirements.  Notably, at the time the AIDS crisis emerged, the agency came 
to accept that requiring full testing in advance was detrimental when promising 
drugs could save lives.14  The agency adopted a policy and issued rules to 
allow drugs for life-saving and debilitating conditions to be approved based on 
preliminary tests on the condition that full testing be completed after the drug 
went on the market.15  The agency’s position was never legally challenged.  
Indeed, Congress enacted it into law.16  While the adaptation of food and drug 
regulation does not involve market incentives like the ones in the 
environmental field that were upheld in Chevron, this “fast track” provision 
illustrates the form in which alternative schemes of regulation can play a role 
in the FDA.17 
 
experienced each in its way, are in a position to offer solutions that do not depart so far 
from the given technical base as to be unacceptable or unworkable. 
Id.; see also JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 33 (1938) (“[T]here are certain 
fields where the making of law springs . . . from a ‘practical’ judgment which is based upon all 
the available considerations and which has in mind the most desirable and pragmatic method of 
solving that particular problem.”). 
 12. Nat’l Confectioners Ass’n v. Califano, 569 F.2d 690, 694–95 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(upholding a rule requiring codes on foods to facilitate recalls).  “A regulation that is self-
evidently rational is not less legitimate than a regulation whose rationality must depend on 
elaborate statistical, expert, or other evidence.”  Id. 
 13. The agency, for example, issued rules for naming foods by giving the percentage of 
important ingredients such as the amount of shrimp in bottles of shrimp cocktail. That approach 
replaced the issuance of food standards that would have mandated a minimum requirement for the 
amount to set the minimum content of ingredients such as shrimp.  Am. Frozen Food Inst. v. 
Mathews, 413 F. Supp. 548, 554 (D. D.C. 1976). 
 14. Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; 
Procedures for Drugs Intended to Treat Life-Threatening and Severely Debilitating Illnesses; 
Interim Rule, 53 Fed. Reg. 41,516 (Oct. 21, 1988) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 312.80). 
 15. Id. 
 16. 21 U.S.C. § 356 (2000). 
 17. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  In the 
drug field, direct financial incentives come from Congress.  For example, Congress gives drug 
companies added periods of market exclusivity for doing pediatric studies. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3) 
(2000).  This extended period can be very valuable, as illustrated by the exclusivity for the 
pediatric testing of Claritin that was worth nearly one billion dollars.  See LARS NOAH & 
BARBARA A. NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 824 (2002) (citing Rachel 
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Important changes have also been made to the food additive provisions that 
set a zero-tolerance approach to carcinogens, and the courts played their own 
adaptive role.  Judge Leventhal recognized that Congress had not mandated a 
rigid, no-risk policy in dealing with trifling risks in food, even for carcinogens, 
when methods to detect or predict the presence of additives became vastly 
more sensitive.18  Although the decision related to detection methods, it made 
the agency more willing to develop policies that had at their core a de minimis 
standard for carcinogens.  The agency prevailed in that interpretation in 
dealing with a similar issue for color additives but only when there was a 
textual basis for allowing low-levels of carcinogens that were constituents in 
other ingredients, and not when the issue concerned directly added 
substances.19  Congress has since adopted a notification approach for indirect 
food additives that accommodates the use of a constituent and a de minimis 
standard.20 
The most striking recent example of an adaptive approach to the rigors of 
the food additive provisions involved a statement of policy in which the FDA 
recognized that genetically modified foods do not ordinarily need prior 
approval of the added gene.  Instead, the genes are presumptively GRAS based 
on their resemblance to traditional plant breeding.21  That policy has been 
judicially upheld as one within the agency’s discretion,22 but the extension of 
the GRAS determination to include substantially equivalent products has had 
its critics.23 
The FDA also makes use of adaptive regulatory techniques involving the 
use of management techniques, as exemplified by its effort to establish good 
manufacturing practices (GMPs) for cooking times to prevent botulism in 
 
Zimmerman, Pharmaceutical Firms Win Big on Plan to Test Adult Drugs on Kids, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 5, 2001, at A1). 
 18. Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy, 613 F.2d 947, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1979). While the Monsanto 
case does not state that it dealt with a carcinogen, those who worked on the matter know that at 
the time of the administrative decision, an ongoing test made it a suspected carcinogen, and that 
by the time of the court litigation, the test had shown it was an animal carcinogen. 
 19. Scott v. FDA, 728 F.2d 322, 325 (6th Cir. 1984) (upholding the constituent theory for 
color additives).  Zero tolerance was found necessary, though, for de minimis carcinogens in color 
additives that were not constituents.  See Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). 
 20. 21 U.S.C. § 348(h) (2000). 
 21. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, Notice, 57 Fed. Reg. 
22,984 (May 29, 1992). 
 22. See Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp.2d 166 (D.D.C. 2000). 
 23. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically 
Modified Foods, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 403 (2002); Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, 
Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and 
Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167 (2004) (analyzing regulatory approaches needed for the 
next-generation developments in biotechnology). 
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whitefish. The agency won on its authority to establish GMPs, notwithstanding 
the logic of the textual argument, based on the public health purpose of the 
statute, but the court found the agency insufficiently articulate in 
acknowledging the implications of its no-risk approach.24  The Department of 
Agriculture, though, was unsuccessful in establishing that it had the authority 
under a similar provision to establish preventative standards in plants to guard 
against the risk of salmonella from incoming meat supplies.25  The FDA’s 
ability to establish GMPs for foods also shows that the agency is not limited to 
a fire alarm model in dealing with risks from foods. 
The fate of agency policies on judicial review is not always as predictable 
as this survey illustrates.  The courts, particularly at earlier times, used a 
purposive approach to statutory interpretation, an approach that can lead to 
upholding adaptive policies but does not always do so.26  Now, under Chevron, 
as the first step, the courts look not at Congress’ purpose, but whether 
Congress has addressed the issue; as the second step, they defer to reasonable 
agency interpretations.27  The Supreme Court’s decision on tobacco restates the 
first step as involving an examination of the text, the statutory context, and 
common sense, but not the statutory purpose.28  That formula still leaves much 
to judicial judgment, and the textual approach can accommodate some changes 
that reflect policy views about the need to deal with new circumstances.29  
Even if the statutory purpose were acknowledged as playing an appropriate 
role, as I believe it should, the determination of Congress’ intent would not be 
easy or always favorable to the agency. 
Some unpredictability should not be surprising when agencies are adapting 
statutes that embody major political compromise in order to deal with new 
circumstances with widespread consequences for different segments of the 
industry and the public.  Agencies should not, though, give up the adaptive 
role.  The agency gets the first crack at working out emerging problems and 
trying to find a solution that will become accepted.  If it can reformulate 
Congress’s primary concern and reconcile that concern with the merits and 
drawbacks of continuing to apply past practices, without going “too far,” it has 
a good chance to prevail in the courts.  That may not be much guidance, but I 
am skeptical that there is a litmus test for finding the legal limits to the scope 
 
 24. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 253 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(discussing FDA procedure for balancing commercial infeasibility against public interest). 
 25. Supreme Beef Processors v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 275 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 26. Compare id. (agency prevails on authority based on purpose), with Monsanto Co. v. 
Kennedy, 613 F.2d 947, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (agency interpretation inconsistent with a 
presumption about Congressional intent). 
 27. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 28. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000). 
 29. Scott v. FDA, 728 F.2d 322, 325 (6th Cir. 1984). 
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of the agency’s authority to adapt its mission to new circumstances and the 
changed views about public needs.30 
II.  IMPORTANCE OF LEGISLATIVE RULEMAKING 
The use of rulemaking was an important way in which the FDA developed 
and implemented its adaptive role.  Professor Claeys recounts that the FDA 
made the “belated discovery” that it could issue legislative rules and that this 
discovery goes beyond the original convention.31  But it really was Justice 
Harlan in Abbott Laboratories who made this discovery, and the agency acted 
on its implications.32  Professor Claeys also points out that the ratification 
theory in Brown and Williamson Tobacco could be used to undercut the FDA’s 
legislative rulemaking authority, irrespective of the support that the Abbott 
case provided. 
I think this would be unfortunate, as the agency would be left with having 
to rely even more on guidance documents,33 and some matters cannot be 
handled through guidance.  Legislative rules are needed to establish broad, 
definitive and innovative standards such as the GMP that required recall codes 
for food and the systematic review program for over-the-counter (OTC) 
drugs.34 
III.  IMPOSED DEREGULATION: THE ’90S AND BEYOND 
A. Dietary Supplements 
I have been discussing the adaptive approach to the law undertaken by the 
FDA.  While some of these changes were deregulatory, it was deregulation that 
the agency supported.  However, in the 1990s deregulation was imposed from 
outside the agency.  Notably, Congress deregulated dietary supplements from 
 
 30. See Margaret Gilhooley, Tobacco Unregulated: Why the FDA Failed, and What To Do 
Now, 111 YALE L.J. 1179, 1191–1203 (2002) (elaborating on the factors that can influence the 
determination of the agency’s delegated authority). 
 31. Claeys, supra note 2 (citing Thomas Merrill & Kathleen Tongue Watts, Agency Rules 
with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002)). 
 32. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 151–52 (1967) (stating that the agency’s 
definitive policy would, if within the agency’s authority, “have the status of law”). 
 33. See Claeys, supra note 2 (criticizing the use of guidance documents).  I see a need for 
agency flexibility about the use of this form of advice, but I am troubled by the idea that the 
agency can state advice that really is firm yet elude judicial review. In an earlier article, I 
identified a possible approach to alleviate this by having private parties request advice on specific 
situations, with the agency providing a timely response, that would ordinarily be sufficiently ripe 
for review.  See Margaret Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Food and Drug Law: When Avoidance 
is Right, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1383, 1390–93 (2002). 
 34. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 253 (2d Cir. 1977); 
see also PETER BARTON HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 588–99 (2d ed. 1991). 
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the drug command and control model.  As a result, the agency now largely has 
a fire-alarm role to deal with problems revealed by the experience of the 
public.35  This enactment illustrates the tensions involved in reconciling 
consumer choice with the paternalism inherent in regulatory schemes that limit 
access to products in order to protect the user. 
B. Commercial Speech 
More recently, deregulation has come from the courts based on the 
constitutional protections for commercial speech.  The Supreme Court found in 
Thompson v. Western States Medical Center that Congress cannot prohibit 
advertisements for variations of a new drug compounded by a pharmacist to 
meet individual needs if other alternatives were adequate to prevent 
deception—including a warning that the product has not been approved by the 
FDA.36  This principle could weaken the rigor of the drug efficacy 
amendments because it may allow drug companies to distribute medical 
articles about new uses of approved drugs with a disclaimer that the FDA has 
not approved the new use.37  These developments may also have some 
implications for the efforts to limit drug costs as noted below. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF FDA REGULATION FOR HEALTH AND DRUG FINANCING 
FDA regulation may seem to be a settled field—placid compared to the 
responsibilities of agencies that have to deal with conflicting goals such as 
those “involving access to health care, at adequate quality and for affordable 
prices.”38  The FDA field has not been all that placid—as the litigation over 
tobacco and commercial speech illustrate. There also is an intense resistance to 
changing the core of the command and control model for drugs.  But I agree 
that health-care financing is especially thorny, and, if anything, it will become 
even more difficult because of the new Medicare prescription drug coverage 
program. 
Government has a more accepted and easier role if it adopts the more 
conservative approach of trying to prevent harm than if it goes further to 
 
 35. See Margaret Gilhooley, Deregulation and the Administrative Role: Looking at Dietary 
Supplements, 62 MONT. L. REV. 85, 118–27 (2001) (exploring whether a safety substantiation 
model could be an adequate alternative if Congress were ever ready to toughen the regulation of 
supplements but did not want to reinstitute the command and control model).  As a political 
institution, Congress is prone to move by compromise and to take intermediate positions. 
 36. 535 U.S. 357 (2002) [hereinafter Western States].  The D.C. Circuit found that 
supplements could use disclaimers about the lack of FDA approval in lieu of meeting the 
statutory testing requirements.  Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d. 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 37. See Margaret Gilhooley, Drug Regulation and the Constitution after Western States, 37 
U. RICH. L. REV. 901, 921–30 (2002) [hereinafter Drug Regulation]. 
 38. Claeys, supra note 2. 
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require that the good be done or that benefits be provided to large numbers.39  
The American public may perceive the new Medicare law as providing seniors 
a “right” to affordable prescription drugs, encompassed in some sort of 
donut—a perception that resembles the rights revolution of the 1960s.  But 
President Bush has adopted a new model for providing that benefit, one that 
uses competition among health insurers to control costs.  Making that model 
“work” or work “well enough” will be a challenge.  How much affordability is 
needed and for what drugs?  Will competition and formularies and co-pays be 
enough? 
In connection with health financing, Professor Tim Jost raises the need to 
consider alternative models such as the direct provision of government services 
to the poor or corporativist models that negotiate budgets between insurers and 
providers.40  In some way, the FDA may be drawn into having to think out new 
ways to deal with the challenges presented by the prescription drug benefit.  
Until recently, for example, the FDA viewed its responsibility for the Hatch-
Waxman generic drug provisions as ministerial, but it undertook last year to 
correct “abuses.” That effort found its way into the new statute.41  The agency 
may be called upon yet again to deal with other aspects of the interface 
between the scientific support for drugs and their cost.  We as a nation are 
launched on a difficult venture to provide affordable drug benefits and health 
benefits to seniors in a way that does not bust the federal budget.  I am unsure 
about how it will be done, or how fully it can be done.  We will need all the 
 
 39. The issue is like that in torts with respect to whether the law should impose liability on 
Good Samaritans who fail to rescue those whom they have not harmed or should leave the choice 
to do good as a voluntary and moral obligation. 
 40. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Law and Administrative Law: A Marriage Most 
Convenient, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (2004). 
 41. See Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug: Patent Listing Requirements 
and Application of 30-Month Stays on Approval of Abbreviated New Drug Applications 
Certifying That a Patient Claiming a Drug is Invalid or Will Not be Infringed; Final Rule, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 36,676 (June 18, 2003) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314); see also Application of 30-Month 
Stays on Approval of Abbreviated New Drug Applications and Certain New Drug Applications 
Containing a Certification That a Patent Claiming the Drug Is Invalid or Will Not Be Infringed; 
Technical Amendment, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,309 (Mar. 10, 2004) (revoking notice-related provisions 
of Final Rule to take account of changes in Title XI of the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 177 Stat. 2066, made to 
sections of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 505 (a), (b), (j) (West 
2004)); see CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 
Guidance for Industry Listed Drugs, 30-Month Stays, and Approval of ANDAs and 505(b)(2) 
Applications Under Hatch-Waxman, as Amended by the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003: Questions and Answers (Oct. 2004), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/6174dft.htm; see also Erika King Lietzan, A Brief History of 
180-Day Exclusivity Under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, 59 FOOD DRUG L.J. 287 (2004) (finding the new law to be “intricate” and 
“undoubtedly will give rise to new interpretative questions”). 
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creative thinking and adaptive regulation that administrative agencies can 
come up with. 
But we will also need all the strategies that Congress can devise.  For this 
reason, the commercial speech doctrine is deeply troubling in placing restraints 
on Congress’ ability to deal with health and safety regulation.  To give an 
illustration, there are some who believe that the direct-to-consumer advertising 
of prescription drugs drives up drug costs.42  Congress’ ability to preclude 
these ads is in doubt given the rigors of the Central Hudson test.  If Congress 
had greater authority, I doubt it would impose a complete ban on the ads, but it 
might consider restraining some types of ads in some ways that are now more 
open to challenge.  Congress needs adequate tools and levers and power to use 
in reaching compromises on measures to restrain prescription drug costs.  
Thus, I think Justice Breyer was right about the cautions he expressed in the 
dissent in Western States about making commercial speech doctrine overly 
rigid.43 
In conclusion, I will say that this conference has chosen an important time 
to provide perspective on the kinds of strategies that can be used for regulation 
in the health field to meet the present challenges and the hard ones ahead. 
 
 42. See Drug Regulation, supra note 37, at 918–19. 
 43. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 389 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
Justice Breyer stated: 
[A]n overly rigid “commercial speech” doctrine will transform what ought to be a 
legislative or regulatory decision about the best way to protect the health and safety of the 
American public into a constitutional decision prohibiting the legislature from enacting 
necessary protections. As history in respect to the Due Process Clause shows, any such 
transformation would involve a tragic constitutional misunderstanding. 
Id. 
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